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Abstract
“Vulnerability” is a key concept for research ethics and public health ethics. This term 
can be discussed from either a conceptual or a practical perspective. I previously pro-
posed the metaphor of layers to understand how this concept functions from the con-
ceptual perspective in human research. In this paper I will clarify how my analysis 
includes other definitions of vulnerability. Then, I will take the practical- ethical per-
spective, rejecting the usefulness of taxonomies to analyze vulnerabilities. My proposal 
specifies two steps and provides a procedural guide to help rank layers. I introduce the 
notion of cascade vulnerability and outline the dispositional nature of layers of vulner-
ability to underscore the importance of identifying their stimulus condition. In addition, 
I identify three kinds of obligations and some strategies to implement them.
This strategy outlines the normative force of harmful layers of vulnerability. It of-
fers concrete guidance. It contributes substantial content to the practical sphere but 
it does not simplify or idealize research subjects, research context or public health 
challenges.
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1  | INTRODUC TION
The concepts of “vulnerability” and “vulnerable groups” have been 
widely used in research ethics theory and in public health eth-
ics. Traditionally, the term describes certain kinds of populations 
deemed worthy of protection.
In 2004 Carole Levine, Ruth Faden, Christine Grady, Dale 
Hammerschmidt, Lisa Eckenwiler and Jeremy Sugarman criticized 
this concept. These authors published an article that had a strong 
impact on bioethics scholars.2 They criticized the excessively broad 
use of the concept of vulnerability that rendered it too nebulous to 
be meaningful. They also signalled the concept’s stereotyping effect. 
In that regard, these authors were correct when they pointed out 
some of these problems. However, their position was overstated.3
In a previous article I distinguished between two spheres of discus-
sion.4 Both spheres are normative as we are dealing with a normative 
concept. The first one can be conceived of as a conceptual- ethical 
sphere. It analyzes the conceptual and normative problems of the 
2Levine C, Faden R, Grady C, Hammerschmidt D, Eckenwiler L, Sugarman J; Consortium to 
Examine Clinical Research Ethics. (2004). The Limitations of “Vulnerability” as a Protection 
for Human Research Participants, American Journal of Bioethics 4 (3): 44- 49.
3Although they do not explicitly say so, they reject this concept. They only accept regula-
tions for research with children (Ibid., p. 44 and 47), and special protections for people 
with permanent cognitive impairments (Ibid: 48.). They propose “special scrutiny” as an 
alternative way to provide targeted protection to participants (Ibid: 48). See also Luna 
(2009 a) op.cit. note 1 p. 128.
4Luna (2009 b), op.cit. note 1 p. 258- 9.
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concept of vulnerability itself. The second encompasses a practical- 
ethical sphere, dealing with the need to protect particular individuals 
and maintaining the relevance and usefulness of the concept of vulner-
ability in the evaluation of protocols. I will use the terms “conceptual 
sphere” and “practical sphere” to shorten the terminology.5 The criti-
cisms of Levine et al. that I hold valid are those that target the concep-
tual sphere of analysis (i.e., a vacuous use, a stereotyping effect, etc.) but 
I believe the concept is still very relevant from a practical sphere and 
these authors have not fully addressed this second sphere. “Vulnerability” 
has an important normative role and a practical and political force. 
These challenges can be captured in two fundamental questions, that is:
1. How should vulnerability be understood? (conceptual question)
2. How should it be accurately used? (practical question)
Even if these are two different spheres of discussion, they are 
closely related. Thus, if we cannot offer a fitting answer to the con-
ceptual sphere, we will not be able to defend its practical relevance. 
That is, if this concept is vacuous and stereotypes populations, it 
cannot be applied successfully. These serious conceptual problems 
should be solved in order to restore its utility and normative force. 
At the same time, the two spheres of discussion present different 
problems. While the conceptual sphere focuses on the correct anal-
ysis and understanding of the concept of vulnerability, the second 
sphere poses how the concept of vulnerability can be applied to the 
ethical evaluation of research ethics and public policy design.
In “Elucidating the concept of vulnerability. Layers not Labels”6 I 
proposed an answer to the first question through the metaphor of 
layers. This proposal has been accepted and even adopted as a valid 
strategy (Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds7 ; Meek Lange, Rogers and 
Dodds8 ; Macklin9 ; Den Hollander et al.10 ).11 Yet, in my earlier work 
I did not tackle the second question. Some of the bioethicists that 
endorsed my previous proposal challenged this lack of analysis and 
introduced a taxonomy as a way forward.
In this paper, I will first sketch my understanding of vulnerability 
and ways to deal with some conceptual sphere challenges. I will show 
that my proposal does not contradict other definitions or accounts 
of vulnerability. Rather, it includes them. Then, I will introduce a 
strategy addressing the second challenge that the practical sphere 
presents. I will identify some key relevant features of the concept of 
vulnerability (its dispositional character and structure and the possi-
bility of a cascade effect). Finally, I will defend an analysis that implies 
a two- step process: an identification step and an evaluation step that 
includes a ranking process using the previously identified features.
2  | THE CONCEPTUAL SPHERE
2.1 | The traditional analysis
Since the Belmont Report was published there has been a tendency 
to label a particular subpopulation vulnerable. I called this approach 
“the metaphor of labels”.12 Affixing the label “vulnerability” to a par-
ticular subpopulation suggests a simplistic answer to a complicated 
problem. Research situations are often highly complex and influ-
enced by the context and this approach overlooks this fact. 
Furthermore, a person or a group of persons may experience differ-
ent kinds of vulnerabilities, and this complexity is ignored if we sim-
ply refer to a group of persons as vulnerable.
In “The Limitations of ‘Vulnerability’ as a Protection for Human 
Research Participants”, Carole Levine et al. present several criticisms 
of the concept of vulnerability. I will focus on only some of the most 
relevant ones.13 Carole Levine et al. say that “[…] the concept of vul-
nerability stereotypes whole categories of individuals, without distin-
guishing between individuals in the group who indeed might have 
special characteristics that need to be taken into account and those 
who do not”.14 These bioethicists are right when they point out this 
problem. We should first consider that stereotyping implies pinning a 
label and a content that cannot be easily removed on individuals or 
groups. And second, stereotyping or labeling persons can harm or 
wrong them. In addition, this strategy prevents us from identifying 
levels of vulnerability. The concept is presented in a dichotomous 
way: you are in or you are out. But among the vulnerable people some 
might be worse off than others.15 Thus, the lack of flexibility of this 
conception of vulnerability should be underscored. It leads to a rigid 
view of the situation and implies conceptual and normative 
problems.16
Another strong criticism that these bioethicists indicate says that 
so many categories of people are now considered vulnerable that vir-
tually all potential human subjects are included.17 They quote regula-
tions, the CIOMS 2002 version among other documents, and then 
explain: “Under one or another of these rubrics, nearly everyone is vul-
nerable, especially since the benefits of research can never be 
5In the original article written in Spanish I called them “theoretical - ethical” and “political- 
ethical” but I was referring to the same distinction. I think this new terminology is clearer. 
See Ibid: p. 258- 9.
6Luna (2009 a), op. cit. note 1, p. 128- 132.
7Rogers W, Mackenzie C, Dodds S. (2012). Why bioethics needs a concept of vulnerability? 
Int J Fem Approaches Bioethics; 5(2): 11- 38.
8Meek Lange M, Rogers W, Dodds S. (2013) “Vulnerability in Research Ethics: A Way 
Forward”, Bioethics: 27:(6): 333- 340.
9Macklin R. (2012). A Global Ethics Approach to Vulnerability. International Journal of 
Feminist Approaches of Bioethics, 5 (2): 64- 81.
10Den Hollander G, Browne J, Arhinful D, Van der Graaf R, Klipstein- Grobusch K. (2016). 
Power Difference and Risk Perception: Mapping Vulnerability within the Decision Process 
of Pregnant Women Towards Clinical Trial Participation in an Urban Middle- Income 
Setting. Developing World Bioethics. https://doi.org/10.1111/dewb.12132.
11Even the last version of the International Ethical Guidelines for Health Related Research 
Involving Humans by CIOMS- WHO (2016) has adopted this strategy. See Van Delden J. 
and Van der Graaf R. 2016. Revised CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines for Health 
Related Research Involving Humans, JAMA (6 December)
12Luna (2009 a) op.cit. note 1, p. 122- 3.
13For a thorough analysis, see Levine, op. cit. note 2, p. 47.
14Levine, op. cit. note 2, p. 47.
15I thank Carla Saenz for this comment.
16Luna. (2009 a) op.cit. note 1, pp. 127- 8.
17Levine, op. cit. note 2, p. 46 (my emphasis).
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guaranteed in advance […]. If everyone is vulnerable, then the concept 
becomes too nebulous to be meaningful”.18 And if this is the case, the 
concept is not relevant. We could argue that this criticism is too 
strong as we can deduce general moral obligations for all, even if we 
cannot deduce special moral obligations for special situations. This is 
right and it justifies the need for the general protection of human 
beings in research. However, when we use the notion of vulnerability 
in research, we try to provide special or specific protections or safe-
guards for some persons in particular and this cannot be achieved 
from this ontological perspective. Moreover, this view eventually 
“naturalizes” vulnerability: if we are all vulnerable and vulnerability is 
a “natural fact” that we all share, we need not avoid it or protect 
some persons from it.19 The “labeling” metaphor, as well as the 
meaningless argument, shows deep problems at the conceptual- 
ethical level of analysis with important consequences at a practical 
level.20 These criticisms need, first, an answer from the heart of the 
conceptual sphere.
2.2 | The structure and functioning of 
vulnerability: the layer metaphor
In “Elucidating the concept of vulnerability. Layers not Labels”21 I 
proposed that the concept of vulnerability be conceived via the no-
tion of layers. The metaphor of layers refers to the functioning of the 
concept. It suggests that there may be multiple and different strata 
and that they may be acquired, as well as removed, one by one. We 
do not face “a solid and unique vulnerability” that exhausts the cat-
egory. There might be different vulnerabilities, different layers oper-
ating. These layers may overlap: some of them may be related to 
problems with informed consent, others to violations of human 
rights, to social circumstances, or to the characteristics of the person 
involved.
For example, we could say that the fact of being a woman does 
not in itself imply that one is vulnerable. A woman living in a coun-
try that does not recognize or is intolerant of reproductive rights 
acquires a layer of vulnerability (that a woman living in other coun-
tries that respect such rights does not necessarily have). In turn, an 
educated and resourceful woman in that same country can over-
come some of the consequences of the intolerance of reproduc-
tive rights. Yet, a poor woman living in a country that is intolerant 
of reproductive rights acquires another layer of vulnerability. (She 
may not have access, for example, to emergency contraceptives 
and hence will be more susceptible to unwanted pregnancies.) 
Moreover, an illiterate poor woman in a country that is intolerant 
of reproductive rights acquires still another layer. And if she is a 
migrant and does not have her documents in order or if she be-
longs to the indigenous people, she will acquire increasingly more 
layers of vulnerabilities. She will suffer under these overlapping 
layers.22
This concept of vulnerability is a contextual one. I understand it 
in the sense that the person may no longer be considered vulnera-
ble if the situation changes. For example, a French working woman 
of reproductive age with middle- to- low income may not be vul-
nerable in a research protocol if she unwillingly gets pregnant (be-
cause in her country she has access to emergency contraception or 
an abortion at the public hospital if she wants). Whereas, if she is 
in El Salvador (where legal abortion is not allowed for any reason), 
that same French woman in that same protocol may acquire a layer 
of vulnerability. She does not become vulnerable, simpliciter.
In addition to the problems mentioned, the label metaphor 
makes two assumptions. First, it assumes a baseline standard for a 
default paradigmatic research subject (a mature, moderately well- 
educated, clear thinking, literate, self- supporting person) and sec-
ond, it makes it possible to identify vulnerabilities in subpopulations 
in opposition to the paradigm or as defaults of the paradigm. This 
model is based on an idealization and simplification of research 
subjects. The problem lies in the nonexistence of these ideal sub-
jects. Moreover, the existence of diverse research subjects within 
groups challenges the idea of homogeneous groups that share the 
category of vulnerability. The subpopulation approach assumes 
that there are necessary and sufficient conditions that populations 
must fulfil to be considered vulnerable. Instead, the layered way of 
viewing vulnerability allows it to target differences or  variations 
within the group and to consider different kinds of  safeguards or 
empowerment tools targeting these different features.23
Thus, as there are no longer any labels or rigid categories, there 
are no fixed subpopulations – people that traditionally could be clas-
sified as vulnerable may not be so in a particular situation and vice 
versa. Interestingly, this conceptual analysis enables us to move 
away from “usual” or “typical” stereotypes.24
In my proposal, 1) no single standard or ideal exists and 
there are multiple factors or sources of vulnerability; 2) they are 
deeply related to the context; and 3) vulnerability is not an  essential 
property of the research subjects or groups per se. In sum, the sub-
population approach and the label metaphor are  inadequate be-
cause they are tantamount to using the vulnerability concept as a 
mere slogan, categorizing and stereotyping persons.
18Levine, op. cit. note 2, p. 46 (my emphasis).
19Luna, (2009 a) op.cit. note 1, p. 128.
20Ibid, pp. 127- 8.
21Ibid, p. 121- 139.
22Ibid, p. 127- 128.
23The layered position can work with individuals but also with subgroups within a popula-
tion. The relevant point is to consider the different layers that are at play and not just take 
one characteristic to represent the group as a whole, be it for an individual or a 
subgroup.
24For example, we generally consider poor, pregnant women vulnerable. However, in cer-
tain situations this might not be true. The Argentine law allows poor, pregnant women to 
collect cord blood through the public bank without charging a fee if they need it for an-
other child. Also, they can donate to the public bank and the public system will cover the 
entire process (even if they need a cord blood transplant for a sibling). So, in this case poor 
pregnant women are adequately treated and covered. Yet, the pressure that commercial 
cord blood banks place on middle- class pregnant women is so strong (through aggressive 
marketing in gynecologists’ private offices, misleading information, manipulating guilt 
feelings on the part of the woman for not being a “good mother”, and so on) that it is the 
middle- class pregnant woman that may become vulnerable (Luna, 2013 p. 325- 332).
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2.3 | The meaning of vulnerability: definitions and  
content
In order to apply this concept properly we have to clarify other 
conceptual issues. “Vulnerability” is an elusive and slippery con-
cept. We must distinguish between the structure and functioning 
of the concept from its “content” or characterization. We have just 
explained the structure of the concept. Its functioning is a relational 
and dynamic one, closely related to the situation under analysis. It is 
not a category or a label we can simply apply. The layered approach 
“unpacks” the concept of vulnerability and shows how the concept 
functions.
Instead, the characterization or content of this concept can be 
related to several definitions. My proposal of layers does not con-
tradict main accounts or definitions of the concept of vulnerabil-
ity. To the contrary, it can include them and complement them.25 
For example, this is the case of definitions of vulnerability such as 
the lack of power and the possibility of exploitation26 , the incapa-
bility of research subjects to protect their interests27 , or of pro-
posals based on risks, wrongs and harms28 . These different ways 
of defining vulnerability can be expressed by various coexisting 
layers. We do not need to choose only one of these definitions. 
For example, the incapability of research subjects to protect their 
interests pointed out by the 2002 CIOMS- WHO definition29 may 
be translated into layers related with informed consent or into lay-
ers related with inadequate guardians to protect participants. 
Moreover, the 2016 CIOMS version maintains its 2002 definition 
but it also includes my proposal of layers (although it does not use 
the word “layer”).30 Yet, there may also be layers having to do with 
socio- economic conditions that could put these persons at greater 
risk or subject them to exploitation (and here we are following 
Zion’s or even Hurst’s definitions).31 In addition, note that Hurst 
explains that “vulnerability as a claim to special protection should 
be understood as an identifiably increased likelihood of incurring 
additional or greater wrong”.32 Hurst shows how the concept re-
lates to other concepts such as harms, wrongs, and normative 
claims. And again, the likelihood of harms and wrongs can be 
translated into different layers. These different definitions points 
to different layers, they show different factors that express vul-
nerability. Thus the structure of the metaphor of layers easily in-
cludes different definitions and we are not obliged to select only 
one of them. This complementary approach of my account has 
already been suggested by Macklin through a different angle.33 
Macklin criticized Hurst’s proposal for its narrowness. She claimed 
that Hurst′s proposal only applies to research and clinical care. 
Public health cannot be easily included. Macklin argues that 
Hurst’s notion of “a claim to special protection” is too narrow. It 
cannot account for circumstances in which culture, custom, tradi-
tion, and laws make women unable to protect themselves.34 
Hurst’s analysis has been, thus, “re- interpreted” by Ruth Macklin, 
who considers that my approach can complement Hurst’s by con-
tributing a contextual and relational aspect to this definition.
Another compatible approach is Kipnis’s identification of 
some “characteristics that are criteria for vulnerability”.35 He en-
dorses a taxonomy with six circumstances: cognitive, juridical, 
deferential, medical, allocational and infrastructural. For exam-
ple, the cognitive circumstance asks if the potential participant 
has the capacity to deliberate on and decide whether or not to 
participate in the study; the juridical questions whether the po-
tential participant is liable to the authority of others who may 
have an independent interest in that participation.36 But in an-
other article about vulnerabilities in pediatric research subjects, 
this author exemplifies seven characteristics. He adds social cir-
cumstances.37 This addition jeopardizes the idea of a clear and 
successful taxonomy. In addition to the reasons I present in the 
next section, the annexation and identification of an extra cate-
gory provides yet another justification to avoid taxonomies.38 In 
Luna 2009 a39 I underscore that Kipnis’s analysis goes in the same 
direction as mine. We both sought an analytical approach instead 
of working from a subpopulation focus. The main difference be-
tween our accounts is that Kipnis proposes a taxonomy (and in 
the next section I explain that taxonomies are not a good strat-
egy). However, I think that we can follow Kipnis’s analytical ap-
proach without committing ourselves to taxonomies. These 
characteristics may serve as a guide. As an open list they may help 
25I thank Ignacio Mastroleo for the suggestion to make this point more explicit.
26Zion D, Gillam L, Loff B. (2000). The Declaration of Helsinki, CIOMS and the ethics of 
research on vulnerable populations. Nature Medicine 6: 613–17. p. 615.
27Council for International Organizations for Medical Sciences (CIOMS) and World Health 
Organization (WHO). (2002) (2nd ed.) International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical 
Research Involving Human Subjects. Geneva: CIOMS.
28Hurst S. (2008). Vulnerability in Research and Health Care; Describing the elephant in 
the room? Bioethics, Vol 22: 4.
29CIOMS- WHO op.cit. note 27
30The new version does follow my ideas and moves away from the traditional sub- 
population approach. In the presentation of the 2016 CIOMS version, the President and 
Scientific Secretary do acknowledge this and quote one of my articles. Van Delden J. and 
Van der Graaf R. op. cit. note 11.
31Zion, op.cit. note 26.
32Hurst, op.cit note 28. p.195.
33Macklin R, op.cit note 9, pp 69- 70.
34Ibid. pp. 69- 72.
35Kipnis K. (2001). Vulnerability in Research Subjects: A Bioethical Taxonomy. In Ethical 
and Policy Issues in Research Involving Human Research Participants. Bethesda. National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission. G1- G12 (p. G4).
36The others are: Deferential: Is the candidate- subject given to patterns of deferential 
behaviour that may mask an underlying unwillingness to participate? Medical: Has the 
candidate- subject been selected, in part, because he or she has a serious health- related 
condition for which there are no satisfactory remedies? Allocational: Is the candidate- 
subject seriously lacking in important social goods that will be provided as a consequence 
of his or her participation in research? Infrastructural: Does the political, organizational, 
economic, and social context of the research setting possess the integrity and resources 
needed to manage the study? Ibid, (p. G4).
37Kipnis K. (2003). Seven Vulnerabilities in the Pediatric Research Subject. Theor Med 
Bioeth 2003;24: 107- 120.
38For further criticism of taxonomies, see Luna 2015 op.cit note 1.
39Luna, (2009 a) op cit. note 1 p. 126 and p.134.
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to identify layers, but they might prove too narrow and rigid if we 
are to be bound only by them as laid out in a taxonomy.
Thus, my proposal accepts all these different definitions and ac-
counts as they show the manifold angles of this layered approach to 
vulnerability.
3  | THE PR AC TIC AL SPHERE
The analysis based on layers was well received. In “Vulnerability in 
Research Ethics: A Way Forward” Meek, Rogers and Dodds say: 
“What is needed is an approach that, first of all captures Luna’s in-
sight that vulnerable research participants inhabit a context gener-
ated by the coming together of layers of vulnerability. The approach 
should make progress towards naming and classifying the layers 
while remaining sensitive to their possible interactions. Last, such 
account should identify vulnerability- related duties”.40 If we return 
to the two- sphere distinction I presented in the introduction, it 
would appear that the conceptual sphere is successful. However, 
there is still work to be done regarding the second sphere.
In “Why bioethics needs a concept of vulnerability?” Rogers, 
Mackenzie and Dodds41 say: “We also outline a taxonomy of different 
kinds of sources of vulnerability which we think is helpful in further 
specifying the layered approach to vulnerability advocated by Luna 
“.42 And Meek et al. contend in reference to my proposal: “Unlike 
Luna’s, our approach gives concrete, general guidance to researchers 
and research ethics committees […]”.43 Thus, while these authors 
view my approach positively at the conceptual level, they want to 
move forward and propose an “upgrade” in the practical sphere.
They suggest going beyond by introducing a taxonomy. I do not 
agree with that proposal: we do not need to name or classify layers and 
do not need a taxonomy. I think that brings us back to a rigid model.
Taxonomies44 are introduced in order to understand or explain 
different phenomena. They have their origin in the biological sci-
ences and have been used successfully in other sciences and con-
texts. Taxonomies may look interesting to research ethics 
committees (RECs) as they help provide a guide or checklist when 
analyzing layers of vulnerabilities. However, they can also be mis-
leading. The problem lies in the difficulty of achieving clarity and 
an orderly classification. Let me illustrate this with an analogy. 
Reality, I believe, tends to resemble a woman painted by Rubens, a 
Baroque figure that is proud of the majesty of her voluptuous 
body. Yet, no corset – despite its strings and fabric – will ever be 
able to “contain” her abundant flesh!45 And this is the case when 
we try to classify layers of vulnerabilities. Taxonomies, like corsets, 
are not enough to categorize reality! The real world is too complex, 
layers of vulnerability overlap and the context interacts with them. 
Taxonomies may function better in simpler systems, such as in 
some biological species ordering, but not so well in open and com-
plex systems like human behavior. Moreover, taxonomies can in-
troduce the illusion of a clear set of categories and suggest a false 
feeling of order.
In “Rubens, corsets and taxonomies: a response to Meek Lange, 
Rogers and Dodds” I argued that a) we do not need a taxonomy to 
classify vulnerabilities, b) Meek et al. do not provide an adequate or 
successful taxonomy,46 and c) they are unable to link their taxonomy 
to specific obligations.47 In this paper I will not go into the details of 
Meek et al.’s analysis or into my criticisms of them.
On reconsidering Meek et al.’s criticisms, I think a practical ac-
count identifying layers and duties can be made in a simpler and 
more useful way. A middle- ground path that does not include tax-
onomies may be more helpful for researchers, RECs and policy mak-
ers. Instead I will introduce a two- step process. The first step should 
identify different layers of vulnerability related with physical prob-
lems, consent, dependency, exploitation, socioeconomic situations. I 
will also underscore some relevant features of layers of vulnerability. 
The second step will evaluate how we can rank these different layers. 
The previous identification of layers and their features will help in our 
evaluation.
3.1 | First step: Identification of layers
3.1.1 | Relevant features to consider: content and 
stimulus conditions of layers
During the first step researchers, RECs and policy makers should 
identify the content of layers of vulnerability that a situation, re-
search or a protocol presents. The different definitions that Zion 
et al., Hurst or CIOMS48 give may help in this analysis. A proposal 
like the one that Kipnis offers can also be endorsed if it is taken as 
a set of open characteristics that can contribute to our analysis 
and serve to identify layers. However, it should accept additional 
characteristics if needed. For example, in this first step we should 
analyze how consent is given, whether social or economic 
 situations are being exploited and generating other layers, 
40Meek Lange, op.cit. note 8 p. 336.
41This team of bioethicists wrote several articles in the same vein: I will focus on these two 
articles: Rogers, op.cit. note 7; and Meek Lange, op.cit. note 8.
42Rogers, op.cit. note 7, p. 19.
43Meek Lange, op.cit. note 8, p. 337.
44The authors sometimes use the term “typology” but they interchange both terms.
45See the complete analysis and analogy in Luna 2015, op,cit, note 1.
46Rogers and Meek Lange et al.’s proposal speak of three “overlapping categories”: 
“Inherent sources of vulnerability include our corporeality, our neediness, our depen-
dence on others and our affective and social natures. […] risk of harm or wrongs depends 
on age, health, gender and disability as well as the person’s capacities for resilience, coping 
and the social supports she may have. Situational sources of vulnerability are context spe-
cific and include the personal, social, political, economic or environmental situation of a 
person or social group. […] Pathogenic sources of vulnerability are a subtype of situational 
sources that arise from dysfunctional social or personal relationships.” Meek Lange, op.cit. 
note 8 p. 336. There is a definitional overlap between inherent vulnerability and the situ-
ational source of vulnerability. In addition, the third type of source is a subtype of the 
previous. These, among other reasons, make it quite difficult, if not meaningless, to use 
the proposed taxonomy. For a deeper analysis, see Luna 2015 , op.cit. note 1.
47Luna 2015, op.cit. note 1.
48See Section I. 2.b “The meaning of vulnerability: definitions and content”.
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whether there are gender issues that may reveal other layers, and 
so on.
In addition, there are two useful features that may help not just 
to specify but to prioritize layers of vulnerabilities – as we will see 
below. The first relevant feature I want to underscore is that layers 
of vulnerability are dispositions and that the structure and relevant 
features of dispositions should be taken in consideration in an eth-
ical analysis.
Being vulnerable or suffering a layer of vulnerability reveals that 
a person might be mistreated/abused/exploited under certain cir-
cumstances. Yet, a person need not be mistreated/abused/exploited 
to be viewed as having a layer of vulnerability or being considered 
vulnerable.49 Moreover, if she is abused, mistreated or exploited, she 
is no longer vulnerable because she has already been harmed, 
abused, and so on.50 It is the possibility of being harmed, mistreated 
or exploited that is relevant. Hurst’s analysis, for example, also as-
sumes this dispositional character when she speaks of an “increased 
likelihood of incurring additional or greater wrong”.51 Hurst′s pro-
posal fits very well to the dispositional analysis of vulnerability that I 
am suggesting. This aspect of the concept of vulnerability which is 
highly relevant; has not been sufficiently analyzed and given the im-
portance it should have (granting some exceptions such as Hurst 
proposal).
The notion and analysis of dispositions are not new. Yet I want to 
underscore that we need a careful consideration of the dispositional 
structure of layers of vulnerability because such analysis can help 
achieve a thorough ethical evaluation. A classic example of a dispo-
sition is the property of being soluble. A sugar lump has the disposi-
tion to solubility. That is, it is soluble if placed in water or a liquid. So, 
the disposition is latent until a specific stimulus condition triggers it. 
This structure of dispositions dependent on a stimulus condition is 
quite relevant. In the case of sugar, the stimulus condition will be the 
event of introducing the solid lump of sugar into any liquid. In the 
case of layers of vulnerability, there can be many different situations 
that can trigger a layer of vulnerability. If that stimulus condition 
does not occur, that layer of vulnerability will never be actualized. I 
believe this idea of identifying a stimulus condition is crucial to the 
analysis and evaluation of layers of vulnerability. It is central if we 
want to correctly protect research subjects and persons. Similarly, 
just as we have identified the stimulus condition to make the lump of 
sugar soluble, we should identify the stimulus conditions that trigger 
a particular layer of vulnerability. If we could do so (and we can erad-
icate, avoid or minimize said disposition), we will probably be able 
to avoid the harmful consequences of layers of vulnerability. Yet, if 
a stimulus condition does not occur or is not probable, the person 
should still be considered to have a layer of vulnerability. But – as we 
will see below – when the REC or the policy designer evaluates this 
situation, that layer will not be a first priority. Rather, it will be other 
layers that can be triggered more easily. Thus, researchers, RECs, 
and policy makers should identify the stimulus conditions that can 
trigger the actualization of a layer of vulnerability in order to design 
suitable protection mechanisms.
3.1.2 | Relevant features to consider: Cascade layers
The second crucial feature is the cascading effect some layers may 
have. Even if I have argued against some points Meek et al. and 
Rogers et al. make, I nonetheless consider that they have provided 
very valuable work. An important contribution by Rogers et al. has to 
do with the concept of a pathogenic source of vulnerability.52 When 
they present their taxonomy they say “[…] some responses (to vul-
nerability) may exacerbate existing vulnerabilities or generate new vul-
nerabilities. We refer to these as pathogenic vulnerabilities. There are a 
variety of sources of pathogenic vulnerability. Pathogenic vulnera-
bility may be generated by morally dysfunctional interpersonal and 
social relationships characterized by disrespect, prejudice or abuse 
or by socio- political situations characterized by oppression, domina-
tion, repression, injustice, persecution or political violence. For ex-
ample, people with cognitive disabilities, who are occurrently 
vulnerable due to their care needs, are susceptible to pathogenic 
forms of vulnerability, such as sexual abuse by their carers”.53
Along the same line, Durocher et al. refer to Rogers et al.’s pro-
posal: “In contrast, pathogenic vulnerability is a state of being at 
risk of having situational or inherent vulnerabilities54 increased or cre-
ated as a result of ongoing relationships or socio- political situa-
tions that have negative or harmful effects”.55 And they refer to 
the same passage I quoted. They had previously cited Powers and 
Faden stating that vulnerabilities may be “cascading and interac-
tive”56 and Fineman explaining that vulnerability in one realm can 
engender vulnerability in another.57
Thus I will distinguish two ways of characterizing this kind of 
layer of vulnerability:
1. Its origin: its generation by morally dysfunctional interpersonal 
and social relationships (the stance stressed by Rogers et al.);
49I thank Eduardo Rivera López for this comment.
50In Spanish we have two different words for this difference: “vulnerable” has the same 
meaning in Spanish as in English and has this dispositional character; “vulnerado” means 
that the person has already been harmed. It is no longer a disposition but a fact that the 
person has already been harmed.
51Hurst, op.cit. note 28 p.195 (my emphasis).
52See note 46 for the characterization of the authors of different sources of 
vulnerabilities.
53Rogers, op.cit. note 7 p. 25 (my emphasis).
54Note that Durocher et al. are not clear about the state or relation among vulnerabilities 
in their typology. Meek Lange et al. previously said it was a subset of the situational layer 
of vulnerability. See note 43. See Durocher E, Chung R, Rochon C, Hunt M. (2016). 
Understanding and Addressing Vulnerability Following the 2010 Haiti Earthquake: 
Applying a Feminist lens to Examine Perspectives of Haitian and Expatriate Heath Care 
Providers and Decision- Makers. Journal of Human Rights Practice 1(20), p.4 (my empha-
sis) and Luna (2015), op.cit. note 1.
55Durocher, ibid. p.4 (my emphasis))
56Powers M, Faden R. (2006) Social Justice: The Moral Foundations of Public Health and 
Health Policy New York: Oxford University Press, p. 69.
57Fineman M.(2008). The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition. 
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 20 (1) : 1- 23.
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2. Its effects: the consequences this kind of layer entails (a chained 
series of events that lead to harmful consequences).
My proposal underscores the second feature, regardless of its 
origin. The origin may not necessarily always have a “pathogenic” 
nature as Roger et al. propose. Yet, the relevance of this distinction 
lies in the normative force involved in its harmful effects: a potential 
to “exacerbate existing vulnerabilities or generate new vulnerabilities”. 
Thus, I hold that what Rogers et al.’s pathogenic source shows is a 
replication or consecutive deployment of harmful effects: a cascade 
effect. There might be occasions when its generation by morally dys-
functional relationships might be present. I am not ruling out that 
possibility. What I want to underscore is the normative force of its 
effects as the most relevant feature to consider. In addition, I think 
the term “pathogenic” is misleading because the denomination as-
similates this kind of vulnerability to disease and pathology. Rogers 
et al.’s notion of a pathogenic source is very useful, though it should 
be formulated in a broader and more neutral sense. I propose we 
name these layers of vulnerability – following the second feature 
identified – as a cascade layer of vulnerability and that we seriously 
consider the devastating power these layers have.
For example, in public health ethics, the lack of an early diagnosis 
of a rare disease can be considered a cascade- vulnerability.58 The 
lack of diagnosis implies lack of knowledge. The situation of uncer-
tainty about these kinds of diseases may last for years with the ac-
companying anguish this implies for the patient, the family and the 
mistreatment of the patient (generating other layers of vulnerabil-
ity). In addition, without a proper diagnosis the illness may evolve, 
making it impossible for the patient to access proper treatment 
when eventually diagnosed. Parents may make reproductive deci-
sions, unaware of the high possibility that they might give birth to a 
child with the same problem, etc… Note that this layer of vulnerabil-
ity can arise because the person faces a rare disease, and the lack of 
a proper diagnosis is one of the basic challenges to this kind of ill-
ness. Hence, neither abusive relations nor oppressive socio- political 
situations are the only situation to trigger this cascading feature.
Cascade layers can frequently be identified in the field of public 
health, given that they are associated with pre- existing conditions, 
context conditions (lack of access to health services, lack of protec-
tive laboral laws, etc), thus policies in the realm of public health can 
eradicate or minimize their effects. But in some cases, this cascading 
feature may prove very difficult to eradicate even with public laws or 
strategies. In the case of policy design and the elderly, we can see 
potentially different layers of vulnerability (economic, communica-
tional, emotional, cognitive, and physical)59 and some of them may 
be considered cascade- vulnerabilities. For example, consider this 
possible layer. Several marriages take place in today’s families and 
new partners may not have an established relationship with the 
parents- in- law or elderly members of the family. In some cases, 
these new partners may not be very receptive to accommodating 
and accompanying older family members and this can give rise to a 
layer of vulnerability for some older people. If this happens, we can 
call this a relational layer: older people feel alone, isolated, and a 
burden on their families. If this relational layer occurs, it can also be 
considered a cascade layer as it can generate psychological harm, 
such as depression, which at the same time can lead to a loss of ap-
petite or mobility, which, in turn, will probably engender fragility and 
physical illnesses, other morbidities, and the like.
As we will see in the next section, cascade vulnerabilities have a 
fundamental role in the process of evaluating the strength or damag-
ing effect of layers. That is why I believe this distinction is key.
In sum, in this first step we should identify the:
1. Content of layers, that is, different existing layers of vulner-
ability (we can use different definitions of vulnerability (Zion 
et al., CIOMS, Hurst), as well as the characteristics that Kipnis 
proposes);
2. Stimulus conditions, that is, determining the triggers of layers and 
the likelihood that they become manifest;
3. Cascade vulnerabilities, that is, layers that have a “cascade 
effect”.
3.2 | The second step: evaluation and obligations
During the second step we should evaluate how to rank and prior-
itize these different layers. We should build on the first step. Based 
on the previous analysis, I propose a process to rank layers where 
the most harmful ones take priority. We should assess harms, wrongs 
and risks involved in the different layers (from physical to psychoso-
cial, including the possibility of exploitation, dependency, abusive 
patterns, etc.). We should begin with the most harmful layers and 
move down to the less damaging ones. As we may have several other 
layers, we should begin by evaluating whether cascade layers exist. 
Cascade layers are frequently the most harmful. They have a “dom-
ino” effect and can trigger several layers. We should give preference 
to layers with a cascade feature because they exhibit a differential 
strength and damaging power. As what we will try to do after is to 
avoid its harmful effects. However, we should weigh several factors: 
not only the damaging effect but the probability that it will happen. 
We should balance the possibility of their occurrence and judge how 
harmful these layers are, as well as the situation under analysis and 
the threats involved.60 This process can be understood from a co-
herentist model. There is no lexicographic order.
How should we do this? We should consider the dispositional 
structure of layers of vulnerability and assess what stimulus condi-
tions can trigger them (their presence and probability of developing). 
Stimulus conditions relate layers with the context, with the actual 
situation and possibility of occurrence. If the stimulus conditions are 
58Luna, op.cit. note 24 p. 450.
59Luna (2014) op.cit. note 1 p. 184- 186.
60For example, if we have to evaluate the risks that some specific protocol imposes on the 
research subject, we should consider whether the intended protocol presents minimum 
risk (e.g., taking blood pressure using routine methods). In such case, the many layers may 
not be so important to remove when compared to a research protocol involving a liver bi-
opsy or other kind of risks to participants. Thus the context or the situation will also be 
relevant for our evaluation.
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highly probable, they should take priority. These conditions are the 
ones that actualize the layers of vulnerability and will provoke actual 
harm. This is why they are the target. We should try to follow the 
established ranking. Nevertheless, sometimes this will not be feasible 
as reality can influence just how possible it is to follow strictly the pre-
ferred ranking. This ranking of layers should be taken as a procedural 
and preliminary guide in order to select from where to begin designing 
adequate safeguards.
Three kinds of obligations61 can be applied to the previous 
ranking of layers and to the identification of stimulus conditions. 
Our first obligation is not to worsen the person’s or group’s situa-
tion of vulnerability (be this with a protocol intervention or with a 
public policy). Thus, we should avoid exacerbating layers of vul-
nerability. A second obligation consists of the eradication of lay-
ers of vulnerability. We should try to eliminate all layers. However, 
we can only demand this to a reasonable and possible extent. 
Thus, the third kind of obligation minimizes layers of vulnerability. 
If –when following the previous obligation- we could not eliminate 
or eradicate these layers, we should consider another alternative; 
we should find different strategies to minimize layers. We should 
use the previous ranking of layers as a guide. Finally, these obliga-
tions can be expressed through different strategies such as pro-
tections, safeguards, as well as empowerment and the generation 
of autonomy.
I believe this process can guide the deliberative thinking  and 
evaluation of researchers, RECs, and public health policies. There is 
no fixed priority, but a guide that should help assess  what our obli-
gations are and from where to begin to tackle  them.
3.3 | Putting concepts at work: a case
An example that shows how these concepts work is the follow-
ing: a drug research project conducted with poor women in 
countries where abortion is illegal. In this case, the possibility 
of pregnancy functions as a cascade- vulnerability. As argued in 
Luna 2009 a62 in the same situation, a woman of a high socio-
economic position will also acquire a layer of vulnerability. 
There is moral harm when she has to undergo an illegal abortion 
(even if it is a safe process and she can afford it). In such case 
this layer will not have the cascade effect, while it will have it in 
the case of women with scarce resources. In the situation of 
these poor women, we can easily imagine the anguish of an un-
desired pregnancy conceived in the middle of a biomedical re-
search project testing new drugs and the fear that the tested 
drug may have a teratogenic effect on the fetus’s development 
(moreover if this happens early in pregnancy – teratogenic ef-
fects frequently occur in the first trimester). If the woman con-
tinues the pregnancy because she has no other option, the baby 
may be born with neurological or other defects that create mul-
tiple problems. If she opts for an illegal and unsafe abortion, 
other harmful consequences might arise: future sterility, mor-
bidity and even mortality. Thus, we should identify whether 
there are stimulus conditions that may actualize this cascade 
vulnerability and assess how probable they are. If stimulus con-
ditions are highly probable, this layer should be prioritized (not 
only is it very harmful with a cascade feature, but it is also quite 
probable). This is the case, for example, when these women are 
poor and lack socioeconomic resources, a formal education and, 
in particular, a sexual education without access to 
contraception.
If the REC considers the research highly relevant for these 
women and their community and it meets other ethical condi-
tions,63 but its members are worried about this cascade layer of 
61I consider some of the obligations Meek Lange et al. proposed (Meek Lange, op.cit. note 
8 p. 336- 337).
62Luna (2009 a), op.cit. note 1 p. 128.
63See CIOMS 2016 regarding pregnant women and research (Gdl 19). Council for 
International Organizations for Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in collaboration with World 
Health Organization (WHO). (2016). International Ethical Guidelines for Health- Related 
Research involving Humans. (3rd ed.) Geneva: CIOMS.
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vulnerability and its stimulus conditions, they should consider how 
not to  trigger this cascade layer. They should assess whether they 
can eradicate or eliminate such dispositional layer. If they cannot, 
they should examine ways or strategies to minimize its occurrence. 
Regarding the possibility of eradication, we should acknowledge 
that without safe policies to end pregnancies, the possibility of 
 having an unwanted pregnancy will always exist despite special 
steps to avoid it. We should also understand that researchers or 
RECs cannot themselves change or issue a suitable law or policy. 
(Yet, if this were the challenge for a public health agency, officers 
could take measures to eradicate it). So, inadequate sexual educa-
tion, the lack of contraception and the lack of emergency contra-
ception are some of the stimulus conditions that can give rise to 
this cascade layer of vulnerability. As was suggested, it may be 
quite difficult for RECs’ members to eradicate this layer; yet, they 
should be able to minimize it. They should consider different strat-
egies: effective protective measures or safeguards, as well as em-
powerment for these women. For example, a first set of necessary 
actions to achieve minimization are: explaining and educating about 
methods to avoid unwanted pregnancies, providing education on 
the use of contraception and access to it (explaining that it is better 
to use a double method and offer two birth control methods, as 
well as the possibility of emergency contraception). They can also 
propose other complementary actions: speaking with the relevant 
health officials, writing articles, giving interviews to the press to 
generate awareness of this restrictive and harmful reproductive 
health policy. I do not think these last suggestions should be oblig-
atory for researchers or even for RECs; they function as supererog-
atory actions to be carried out to raise awareness of the problems 
involved. The RECs cannot eradicate that layer of vulnerability but 
by requiring researchers to implement at least the first set of pro-
tections  mentioned, they can minimize it. However, if a REC thinks 
these strategies do not suffice (because these women will not be 
able to adhere to and use birth control owing to their partners’ re-
fusal or because it may lead to intra- family violence, etc.), the REC 
may 1) reject the protocol or 2) choose not to recruit these kinds of 
women into the study and set clear conditions for the participation 
of other women.64 RECs should carefully examine how they evalu-
ate layers, what kinds of provisions and safeguards should be in 
place for each layer.
4  | FINAL THOUGHTS
Let us revisit some previous criticisms. Meek et al. pointed out 
that my approach: “[…] should make some progress towards nam-
ing and classifying the layers while remaining sensitive to their 
possible interactions. Last such an account should identify vulner-
ability related duties”.65 As I said earlier, I do not believe that clas-
sifying or naming layers is the relevant task. The identification of 
taxonomies or of types of vulnerabilities is not pertinent. The nor-
mative force of harmful layers and avoiding the damage that may 
ensue is what matters. I propose two steps: an identification step 
and an evaluation step. I highlight two relevant features of layers 
(their dispositional character and the possibility of having a cas-
cade effect). These features are used in the evaluation process and 
I recognize three kinds of obligations. My proposal relies on the 
power and probability of layers of harms, risks or threats to indi-
viduals or groups (this is why cascade vulnerability is so relevant 
– it involves the generation of new layers and risks). Researchers, 
RECs and policy makers in the case of public health ethics should 
be concerned about the eradication and minimization layers, 
rather than about identifying connections with taxonomies (espe-
cially when such typology does not lead to a direct assessment of 
duties).66
Even though I am offering a procedural guide, it is still essential 
that we make an exhaustive examination. My proposal forces us to 
make a moral deliberation and to avoid an easy and automatic anal-
ysis using checklists. But it provides valuable guidance on how and 
what to prioritize and try to tackle first. I believe that RECs, as well 
as policy makers in the case of public health, should make a thorough 
ethical analysis. They cannot rely on a list of “supposedly” vulnerable 
populations because – as was shown – this attitude risks stigmatiz-
ing these groups.
This proposal provides a feasible and useful answer to the 
practical sphere. It suggests a middle- ground solution between a 
rigid taxonomy and just layers. It integrates standard definitions 
and accounts of vulnerability (Zion et al., Hurst, CIOMS, Kipnis). 
It underscores relevant features of layers and offers a process 
for ranking and evaluating with explicit obligations to guide 
 researchers, RECs and policy makers. This analysis generates 
 obligations but it is clearer and simpler than the taxonomy- based 
proposal. It offers concrete guidance. It contributes substan-
tial content to the practical sphere but it does not simplify or 
idealize research subjects, research context or public health 
challenges.
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